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FORUM CONSTITUTIONNEL 1
ALBERTA NURSES v. A CONTEMPTUOUS
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
Judy Fudge and Harry Glasbeek
BACKGROUND
Whenever capital/labour conflict comes to court, the
conventional portrayal of an even-handed rule of law admin-
istered by an autonomous above-the-fray institution comes
under severe pressure. The story of the judiciary's involve-
ment in these cases is one of hostility to the collective rights
of labour; it sees the rule of law as a means to constrain the
rights of labour in a class-divided polity. Its decisions tend to
reveal the essentially conflictual nature of capital/labour re-
lations. In part, this explains why liberal pluralist academics
and policy-makers - who are keen to deny the existence of
class relations - have put a great deal of intellectual and
political effort into the creation of employer/employee regu-
latory schemes which, amongst other things, marginalize the
role of the judiciary.
The resulting statutory collective bargaining regimes are
presented as schemes in which labour has been granted
sufficient legitimate countervailing power to do away with the
grosser of the imbalances. The state's role in the schemes
is characterized as that of a facilitator. It is to put the parties
in a position where it can be said to be fair to leave them to
determine their own fate. They are allowed to use economic
warfare as a basis for the reaching of voluntary settlements
in respect of the rules and conditions which are to govern
work relationships. A shared ideology is to be the inevitable
by-product of the web of rules so created.' The system, then,
is pictured as one which promotes the sovereignty and
autonomy of parties who are to resolve their disputes in a
progressively reformed setting which they both accept. What
this pictures goes to great length to hide is thatthe employers'
and the state's capacity to restrain and repress labour has
never been abandoned.
This became clear in the 1960's when workers, playing
catch-up after an economic boom and in political circum-
stances where self-assertion was common, found them-
selves disadvantaged by collective bargaining law's
restrictions on their economic muscle. But, with a confidence
which, in large part, stemmed from the legitimacy the scheme
had supposedly bestowed upon their use of collective rights,
workers were willing to step beyond the technical constraints
of the governing statutes. They did not believe that, in this
atmosphere, their extra-legal collective efforts would cause
them to be treated as outlaws. They were wrong.
Employers and governments went to the courts to ask
for restraining orders. The courts were only too happy to
enforce those aspects of the rule of law which they had
devised to restrain and repress labour prior to the advent of
statutory collective bargaining. Disobedience of the orders
they made pursuant to these rules could be treated as
contempt of court and lead to the imposition of fines and
imprisonment.
Rapidly, the historically anti-labour courts were moving
back from the margins to the centre of capital/labour regula-
tion. Employers and governments had made this reposition-
ing possible by their desire to exploit the judiciary's exclusive
right to exercise legally-sanctioned coercive power. Simulta-
neously, however, they had created a dilemma: once again
the rift between capital and labour was becoming visible, as
was the fact that state institutions and the supposedly neutral
rule of law had never ceased to favour capital's interests. The
carefully-crafted labour relations regulatory mechanism was
in danger of losing its legitimacy.
A spate of public inquiries resulted.2 The conclusion of
the ensuing reports was that the courts should be pushed
back towards the periphery. To allow this to happen, the
reports argued, it would be necessary to give the labour
relations boards more remedial powers to take up the result-
ing slack.3 Recently, pressures have been put on the
patched-up system.
The precipitous economic decline which began in the late
1970's has led to a drive to restructure the economy. This
restructuring is based on the assumption that globalized
competition and production is desirable and inevitable. The
resulting local unemployment has made employers impatient
with the rigidities which they claim statutory collective bar-
gaining imposes on them. While liberal pluralists and policy-
makers continue to espouse the rhetoric used to bolster the
labour relations system they helped establish in the 1960's
and the 1970's, larger employers and conservative govem-
ments are doing everything they can to undermine it.
4
Coincidentally, during this period of restructuring and
reassertion of late 18th century ideology, the judiciary has
been given the CharterofRights and Freedoms to administer.
Amongst other things, the Charter empowers the courts to
interpret and apply undefined rights, such as freedom of
association, expression and political belief, with a view to
constraining government action. These freedoms are those
which are called into question every time collective labour
seeks to challenge or to resist capital. At the time of the
Charters entrenchment, many of its more thoughtful liberal
supporters could see that, given the history of labour law
jurisprudence and the new approach of capital to labour
relations, the courts' new discretionary powers might well be
exercised by them in such a labour-unfriendly way as to
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delegitimate the whole of the constitutional judicial review
system and process.5 They were right about the judiciary's
inability to overcome its anti-labour predilections. But their
fears that the judiciary might thereby bring the Charter regime
into disrepute were not shared by the courts.
The courts, especially the Supreme Court of Canada,
have been vicious in their interpretation of the Charter when
called upon to deal with the rights of labour. Prior to the
United Nurses ofAlberta (UNA) decision, the Supreme Court
of Canada had been asked to pronounce seven times on the
collective rights of labour and seven times it had defeated
labour s claims.6 Apparently, if it is conscious of the larger
issues at all, the Court has made a judgement that, in the
new order and ideology of capital/state/labour relations, its
anti-labour version of the rule of law will not undermine its
legitimacy as much as it did in the more liberal years of the
1960's and early 1970's. The recently decided United Nurses
of Alberta case makes this all too clear.
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THE FACTS OF THE CASE IN CONTEXT
In 1982, the UNA exercised its legal right to strike. The
government passed back-to-work legislation which the union
ignored. No sanctions were invoked and a collective agree-
ment was concluded. By 1983, the government, which
wanted to control government costs, passed legislation which
prohibited workers in the broader public sectors from striking.
Impasses were to be resolved by the imposition of an agree-
ment by an arbitrator who was to have due regard to govern-
ment fiscal policy, the state of the provincial economy and
wages in both the private and non-union sectors. The gov-
ernment was taking the logic of economic restructuring seri-
ously and undoubtedly hoped that its leaner and meaner
approach to its employees would stiffen the backbone of
recession-pressured private employers. In due course, this
legislation - which took away the right to strike from unions
such as the UNA - was challenged as a violation of the
freedom of association guaranteed by the Charter of Rights
and Freedoms. In the strike trilogy, the Supreme Court of
Canada upheld the restricting legislation. It probably pleased
the majority of the Court to let people think that, in upholding
the view which courts had propounded for a century or more,
namely, that the right to strike was a right which was secon-
dary to individualistic rights, it was paying deference to
legislatures which had belatedly come to the same view.
While the Charter challenge was going through the
courts, the Alberta government got even leaner and meaner.
Not content with having an arbitrator impose conditions after
a hearing in which unions could participate, it unilaterally
imposed a wage freeze for broader public sector workers in
1987.
The UNA felt it could not accept the freeze. Its leadership
said it had no recourse but to call a strike and announced
that it would convene a meeting of the members so that they
could vote on the issue on January 22,1988. Before this date,
the employers were before the Alberta Labour Relations
Board to ask that it issue a directive to the union which would
tell it to desist from threatening or from leading a strike. The
employers based their request on the 1983 law which had
made a nurses' strike illegal. Itwas an irresistible application.
The Board issued the directive. Nonetheless, the strike
vote was held on January 22 as scheduled. The members
supported the strike. The strike was to begin on Monday,
January 25, 1988. On Sunday, January 24, the employers
were back before the Labour Relations Board to obtain yet
another directive. This time they were armed with the certain
knowledge that the union was about to lead the strike. The
Board issued a second directive. The employers rushed over
to a clerk of the Queen's Bench of Alberta on that very same
Sunday, with both directives in their hands to have them
registered as orders of the Court.8 The strike began on
January 25. Margaret Ethier, the leader of the union, told the
press that she knew the directives had been filed as orders
of the Court but said that the strike would go on anyway.
Four days later, on January 29, the Attorney-General of
Alberta was before the Court asking that the UNA be held in
criminal contempt because it was in breach of a court order
not to strike. He asked the Courtto impose a fine of $1 million
on the union and to sequester its property. On February 3,
Sinclair J. found that the union was in contempt and, on
February 4, he imposed a fine of $250,000 to be paid within
five days. Failure to pay within that time would lead to
automatic sequestration of the union's funds. On February 9,
as union officials were attending at court to pay the fine, they
were served with notice of a second charge of contempt laid
against UNA by the Attorney-General. Subsequently, the
Attorney-General asked O'Byrne J. to convict the union for
criminal contempt again because it was still on strike. On
February 18, the judge did just that. Apparently the contempt
was not as serious this time because the union was fined only
$150,000. In due course, the union paid this fine as well.
In short, the Alberta Labour Relations Board directives
were treated as if they were court injunctions. Disobedience,
therefore, demonstrated a flagrant disrespect for the rule of
law. This attracted the ultimate sanction: a conviction of
criminal contempt of court. In 1992, the Supreme Court of
Canada, in a 4:3 decision, upheld these convictions.
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LEGAL ISSUES
Four points of law were in contention before the Supreme
Court of Canada. We will address only two of these, and one
of these only briefly-'0 First, does a trade union have the kind
of legal personality attributes which allowed the imposition of
a criminal sanction on it? Second, is criminal or civil contempt
the appropriate remedy in the circumstances which brought
the union before the court in this case?
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Legal Personality
One of the purposes of statutory regulation of labour
relations has been to remove the legal hurdles which the
common law imposed on trade unions. As unincorporated
associations they had not been able to enter into enforceable
agreements or have employers recognize them as legal
partners. Courts in their anti-collectivism used the limited
legal status subsequently bestowed on unions as a platform
to make unions, as such, subject to duties and responsibilities
imposed by the common law. Anti-collectivist remedies were
rendered more effective in this way. This is the kind of
manipulation which gave rise to the anti-judicial sentiments
of modern collective bargaining proponents.
But precisely because, for so long, their own jurispru-
dence had treated unions as not having any legal personality,
it always has been technically difficult for courts to justify their
characterization of unions as legal persons.1 1 Nonetheless,
when the issue is whether or not a trade union can be held
in contempt, the judiciary does not seem very troubled by
legal technicalities. In UNA, the members of the Supreme
Court of Canada who addressed the issue were unani-
mous. 12 For all of them - including Cory J., who differed
substantially on the contempt issue - it was simply a matter
of common sense, of evenhandedness: the statutory right to
bargain collectively is a privilege; it is only fair that it should
attract obligations.
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Criminal or Civil Contempt
In the abstract, the distinction between criminal and civil
contempt is easy to maintain. Civil contempt is constituted
by the disobedience of a judgment or a court order made to
benefit a particular individual. The justification is the protec-
tion *of an individual's interests. By contrast, criminal con-
tempt is constituted by words, acts or writings which obstruct
or discredit the administration of justice. Bribing a witness or
a juror, attempting to influence a judge, accusing a judge of
unacceptable bias or disobeying a court order made in a
criminal case all may be treated as criminal contempt. The
idea is that a sanction is warranted because society as a
whole will sufferthe consequences. Difficulties arise because
disobedience of a judgment or a court order made in favour
of an individual may well amount to wilful defiance of a court.
At this point, civil and criminal contempt become conflated.
One of the more frequently recurring instances of this is
the failure of workers and their unions to abide by a labour
injunction which has been granted as an order favouring an
employer's position during a strike. On the face of it, such an
order is issued for the benefit of one individual -the employer.
Defiance of such an order, however, can be characterized as
public defiance of a court order and, therefore, as the kind of
activity which strikes at the dignity of the rule of law. When
will this be warranted? The Charter of Rights and Freedoms
regime ought to have made this question more troublesome
than it used to be. Section 7 of the Charter requires that a
crime be defined with certainty, lest it violate fundamental due
process principles. This means that the mens rea of the
offence needs to be spelt out clearly.
The McLachlin majority held that a criminal contempt was
committed when an accused defied a court order 14 with the
intent or knowledge of, or recklessness as to, the fact that
the public disobedience will tend to depreciate the court's
authority in the public mind. She indicated that these guide-
lines were precise enough to satisfy the requirements of s.7.
That is, given these criteria a citizen would be able to know
when she was going to cross the line which separates
legitimate dissent from criminal conduct. This is highly ten-
dentious.
Cory J. did not address the question of whether the
vagueness of the definition of criminal contempt of court
offended s.7 of the Charter directly. However, he did have to
face the issue of whether or not there had been the kind of
public defiance which was the hallmark of criminal contempt.
He went through the statements made by Margaret Ethier,
the president of the UNA, when she acknowledged that she
understood that a court order had been made, in great detail.
He characterized her behaviour notto be the kind of defiance
which amounted to a criminal discrediting of judicial authority.
Rather, Cory J. thought that what the union and its leadership
was doing was to exercise another Charter right: freedom of
speech. He underlined the fact that the union leaders had
clearly indicated that they were not quarrelling with the Court,
but with their employers. Cory J. also emphasized that "both
unions and management rely on publicity to raise public
awareness of the issues involved in [a labour] dispute. ' 15 He
noted that unions had more trouble communicating with the
public than employers generally do and suggested that
speeches, picket lines and strikes were inherently legitimate
tactics during an on-going dispute between private parties.
The fact that this analysis was possible suggests that
McLachlin J. and her associates were overstating their case
considerably when they argued that the elements of the mens
rea of the offence of criminal contempt they had specified
made for certainty in the law. After all, two wings of the
Supreme Court of Canada were able to characterize the
same words and events very differently. The incoherence and
indeterminacy of dghts and freedoms under the Charter of
Rights and Freedoms is, once again, made evident. Clearly,
the way in which a judge views labour relations and the
appropriate content of freedom of speech will change the
meaning given to the elements which need to be proved to
make a criminal contempt charge stick.
This is made manifest by the way in which Cory J. wrote
his judgment. He argued that, over time, the naked anti-la-
bour attitude of the courts had brought the judiciary into
disrepute. Public opinion and public policy had made it crystal
clear that capital/labour relations regulation had to allow for
a collective role for unions. The relative autonomy of the
regimes created derived its justification from the conceptu-
alization that private parties were reaching voluntary settle-
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ments and that the law should be used to facilitate this and
enforce the collective agreement which resulted. Cory J.
pointed out that for the judiciary to use sanctions traditionally
employed by it to smash unions would be to attack the
legitimacy of the labour relations regime and, even more
importantly, would threaten to bring the courts into the same
kind of contempt they had been held in by policy-makers and
labour relations participants in the 1960's and 1970's.16
Cory J.'s apparent sensitivity is not to be mistaken for
softness on the issue of unruly worker behaviour. To the
contrary, his approach mirrors that of a long line of liberal
pluralist labour relations experts who see the statutory col-
lective bargaining scheme as a way of co-opting and contain-
ing the collective power of workers. 17 Thus, Cory J. goes to
great length to point out that there were plenty of other ways
to sanction the disobeying trade union:
The decision to violate the Board's order is repug-
nant. It left the union open to civil contempt pro-
ceedings as well as the penalties provided by the
provincial Labour Relations Act. Yet those penal-
ties were quite sufficient to punish any union's
conduct and discourage any future disobedience
of orders.
18
Indeed, the Alberta Rules of Court provide that people in
civil contempt are liable to imprisonment until they have
purged their contempt, or to imprisonment for at least one
year, or to pay a fine of $1,000 per day and, in default thereof,
to imprisonment for a year. In addition, the Labour Relations
Act itself provides for penalties for breaches of the Board's
order. The penalties are fines of up to $10,000 a day for each
day that a strike continues illegally, as well as fines of up to
$10,000 for officers or representatives of the trade union who
encourage or condone illegal strikes. That is, there were
plenty of other ways to repress workers and trade unions.
Cory J. thought that it was quite inappropriate to use some-
thing as potentially delegitimating of both labour relations and
the judiciary as criminal contempt of court, at least as long
as containment could be achieved by letting the administra-
tive regime work:
The unrestrained use of criminal contempt pro-
ceedings in labour relations matters will once again
give rise to the perception that the courts are
interfering with the collective bargaining process
and intervening on behalf of management. If that
perception persists, the courts will no longer be
seen as impartial arbiters but as the instrument
used by society for imposing crushing penalties on
unions and union members.
1 9
His emphasis, then, was that, whenever possible, labour
struggles should be treated as private realm disputes subject
to private realm rules. Here it is to be noted that a number of
individual nurses were held in civil contempt for refusing to
work during the strike. This was a consequence of their
employers' application to a court for such an order, that is,
the result of a private individual enforcing private rights. As
much as $27,000 was paid in fines by these convicted nurses,
hardly a bagatelle. Obviously, Cory J. was right; effective
restraint is possible without resort to the use of the criminal
contempt power.
The distinction between the majority and the dissent is
not one of goals. Both want trade unions to respect the law
and the rule of law. Technique was the issue. Cory J. was
concerned about the viability of industrial pluralism and the
judiciary's integrity. McLachlin J. and her associates obvi-
ously felt none of these compunctions. From their perspective
it was plain that in this case, unlike in the right to strike cases,
a feigned deference to other regulatory bodies would not
permit the reaching of a result which they deemed desirable.
Consequently, there is not even a suggestion that the judici-
ary should be deferential to the supposedly autonomous
administrative regime or that the Court should be truly careful
about how it exercises its most repressive power. Perhaps it
is a little too far-fetched to suggest that these members of the
Supreme Court of Canada felt that, because they are the
interpreters and appliers of the sacrosanct Charter of Rights
and Freedoms, their prestige cannot be seriously under-
mined. Nonetheless, there is a good deal of confidence, if not
arrogance, in the majority's decision in the UNA case.
Perhaps the real reason for this confidence lies in the
fact that big business and conservative govemments are
abandoning the post-war liberal pluralist entente reached
between the state, capital and labour. The judiciary, as an
institution, never has accepted that entente and now may feel
fortified bythe elites' abandonment of it. Certainly, in the UNA
case, the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada seems
to have appreciated the opportunity to reassert the validity of
the judiciary's ancient views. Cory J.'s nostalgia for the
mediated labour relations system of the 1950's and 1960's
seems almost radical or, at the very least, out of step with the
much more brutish and primitive times in which we live and
which apparently resonate with the views of the majority of
the Supreme Court of Canada.
Judy Fudge and Harry Glasbeek, Osgoode Hall Law
School, North York, Ontario.
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